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Prior research has established that while the use of concrete, familiar examples can
provide many important benefits for learning, it is also associated with some serious
disadvantages, particularly in learners’ ability to recognize and transfer their knowledge
to new analogous situations. However, it is not immediately clear whether this pattern
would hold in real world educational contexts, in which the role of such examples
in student engagement and ease of processing might be of enough importance to
overshadow any potential negative impact. We conducted two experiments in which
curriculum-relevant material was presented in natural classroom environments, first with
college undergraduates and then with middle-school students. All students in each study
received the same relevant content, but the degree of contextualization in these materials
was varied between students. In both studies, we found that greater contextualization
was associated with poorer transfer performance. We interpret these results as reflecting
a greater degree of embeddedness for the knowledge acquired from richer, more
concrete materials, such that the underlying principles are represented in a less abstract
and generalizable form.
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INTRODUCTION
Educators at all levels are frequently encouraged to incorporate concrete, meaningful, real-world
examples into their lessons (e.g., Rivet and Krajcik, 2008). In fact, this advice probably seems like
a truism to most teachers. For instance, although the principles of Mendelian inheritance could
be discussed in an entirely abstract and general way, instructors are far more likely to introduce
these ideas in terms of specific, familiar, real-world domains such as eye color or the traits of
pea plants. There are solid practical and theoretical reasons for couching new material in terms
of familiar examples. Maintaining student attention and engagement is a constant concern, and
research shows that more concrete materials tend to increase student interest (Sadoski et al., 1993).
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that familiar and concrete examples are simply easier
to process than more abstract representations. For example, in the original abstract version of the
Wason (1966) selection task (a classic test of conditional reasoning), only 4% of the participants were
able to generate the logically correct solution. However, when the task was instantiated in a familiar
concrete domain (such as legal drinking ages), success rates rose to 70%ormore (Johnson-Laird et al.,
1972; Griggs and Cox, 1982). Similarly, when LeFevre and Dixon (1986) gave participants a task in
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which the verbal instructions and the concrete instructional
example were inconsistent with one another, over 90% of the
participants simply followed the example while disregarding the
instructions. This suggests a strong preference for the processing
of concrete, instantiated information (also see Anderson et al.,
1984; Ross, 1987). In fact, meaningful connections to existing
knowledge seem to play a fundamental role in memory and
understanding. For example, Bransford and Johnson (1972) found
that recall and rated comprehension for a written passage doubled
when it was framed in terms of a familiar schema. It is therefore
no surprise that meaningful, concrete examples are encouraged
in pedagogy—they are typically associated with substantial
improvements in comprehension, memory, and reasoning.
Cognitive Costs of Concreteness
Despite these compelling benefits, more recent evidence suggests
that concrete instructional examples may also come with some
significant costs. For example, any extraneous detail in the
presentation of information tends to distract learners from the
relevant content, leading to poorer recall for that material (the
“seductive details effect”; Garner et al., 1989; Harp and Mayer,
1998). More insidiously, even those concrete details that are
integral and relevant to the examples may harm learning by
impairing transfer to new situations. For example, Goldstone
and Sakamoto (2003) taught participants about the principle of
competitive specialization through a simulation portraying ants
foraging for food. In this case, neither the ants nor the food
were superfluous to the learning—they were integral components
of the training example. The researchers nonetheless found that
the perceptually detailed representation of these entities could
impair participants’ ability to generalize their knowledge to a
new, dissimilar case, especially for poorer learners. When the
ants and food were depicted in a more abstract, idealized form
(as dots and color patches), transfer was improved. Other studies
using very different kinds of materials have reported similar
patterns (e.g., Clement et al., 1994; Kaminski et al., 2008). In
all of these cases, the concreteness that likely improved learners’
comprehension also appeared to more firmly embed the concepts
in their original specific context. When confronted with a new
analogous situation in which the surface details were changed,
the richness of the previously learned representations seems to
havemade it more difficult for individuals to perceive the relevant
connections.
In addition to the more objective aspects of concreteness,
similar effects may be observed when interacting with materials
that are particularly personally engaging. For instance, Son and
Goldstone (2009) taught participants the fundamentals of Signal
Detection Theory through the example of a doctor diagnosing
patients. When the training case was “personalized” by using
passages written in the second-person (“Imagine that you are
a doctor who looks at blood samples: : :”), performance on a
transfer test was impaired relative to a more general third-person
description (“Imagine a doctor who looks at blood samples: : :”).
Even a third-person description, if given a personalized referent
(“Juan has to know how many gallons of milk: : :”), can lead
to poorer transfer than non-personalized materials (Riggs et al.,
2015). DeLoache has found similar patterns in work with younger
children (e.g., DeLoache, 1991, 1995; DeLoache and Burns,
1994). In addition to demonstrating poorer generalization from
materials that are objectively more concrete, she also finds
that personal interaction with the physical training materials
can impair transfer. There are competing results that indicate
benefits of personalizing learning materials to the goals of the
learner (Moreno and Mayer, 2004) and incorporating personal
pronouns (“your lung”) vs. a more generic framing (“the
lung”; Mayer et al., 2004), but the tests of learning in these
cases did not involve generalization to new and dissimilar
situations.
Perversely, then, it is those very same qualities that are
so beneficial in the learning of new material—concreteness,
familiarity, personal relevance—that appear so detrimental to the
generalization of that knowledge. This is no minor annoyance.
The primary goal of education is to prepare students to think
outside of the classroom. Students may be learning about basic
algebra in terms of apples and oranges, but the hope is that
they will then be able to appropriately apply these principles in
order to understand their mortgages, modify their recipes and
calculate their gas mileage. A failure to support generalization
could reasonably be interpreted as a failure of education overall
(see Day and Goldstone, 2012).
Integrating Concrete and Idealized
Materials
Of course, the relationship between knowledge acquisition and
knowledge transfer is more complex than a simple “either/or”
dichotomy. Most obviously, acquisition is a prerequisite for
transfer: students cannot generalize information that they
have not first learned. A teacher therefore cannot simply
decide to emphasize generalizability while disregarding
comprehensibility. The situation is further complicated by
the fact that contextualization and concreteness can have effects
that vary under different circumstances and with different
measures. For instance, McNeil et al. (2009) asked participants
to solve money-based word problems either with or without the
use of perceptually rich manipulatives (bills and coins). On the
one hand, they found that these participants were less successful
in generating the correct answer when concrete objects were
used, consistent with the previously discussed research. On the
other hand, use of these manipulatives was associated with fewer
conceptual errors. That is, while these participants performed
more poorly in their calculations, they appeared to have a more
accurate and meaningful understanding of how the numbers in
the problems should be integrated. Koedinger et al. (2008) also
reported a more complex relationship between problem solving
and grounded representations, finding that simple mathematical
word problems were solved more successfully when they were
described verbally, while more complex problems benefited
from formal mathematical representations that stripped away the
grounded references.
While laboratory studies seem to support a decreased reliance
on contextualized materials, one might reasonably be skeptical
about whether these results would extend to real students in
real classroom contexts. Considering the obvious ramifications of
these laboratory results for the field of education, it is particularly
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important to test these effects in naturalistic educational settings,
as the experimental contexts common in laboratory research
may not necessarily warrant generalization to authentic classroom
environments (Bronfenbrenner, 1976; Newman and Cole, 2004).
For one, students enrolled in real classes endure real consequences
(namely, worse grades) when they fail to learn the material,
and they may have more invested in learning transferable
representations than study participants. Moreover, authentic
learning contexts would include self-guided study (with frequent
opportunities for interruption and distraction), and extended
time (days or weeks) between initial exposure and testing.
Given the even greater likelihood of distraction and poor
comprehension in these environments, it is possible that the
balance of priorities would shift in favor of those factors that most
directly support student attention and engagement. Consistent
with this possibility, some prior work has reported reasonably
strong transfer effects from fairly concrete training materials (e.g.,
Fong et al., 1986).
In order to assess these issues, we conducted two studies
involving the presentation of curriculum-based materials in the
course of regular instruction. In particular, we sought to answer
the questions: In natural educational settings in which students
are learning material of direct relevance to their classes, will
the use of contextualized materials impair students’ ability to
transfer their knowledge to new situations, consistent with most
previous laboratory studies? Or, in contrast, will the benefits of
improved attention, engagement, and comprehension associated
with contextualization provemore important given these learners’
particular vulnerabilities to distraction?
Given that this is an initial attempt to generalize a diverse body
of laboratory findings to a more natural environment, we have
chosen to construe “contextualization” in a fairly broad manner.
For the present purposes, we define contextualization as the
inclusion of potentially salient content that embeds the learning
material in a specific domain or scenario, but that is extraneous to
the general principle of interest. This definition includes increases
in the concreteness, or the degree of physical, perceptual detail
presented in training materials, as well as superfluous situational
information that is not inherently perceptual. Furthermore, we
include in our construal the possibility of extraneous detail that
is introduced by the learners themselves as a function of their
prior knowledge about and associations with a given context.
For instance, a dog expert would be likely to experience more
contextual effects from an example involving dogs than from
one that describes a less personally familiar domain, because the
former could engage a large body of existing specific knowledge.
The present experiments manipulate context in a variety
of complementary ways. While we make some efforts in our
experimental design to distinguish these and assess their relative
contributions, in other instances we explore conditions in which a
number of different kinds of contextualization are simultaneously
brought to bear.
EXPERIMENT 1
Our first study was conducted in undergraduate Introductory
Psychology classes. This course can present particular challenges
to instructors. The material covered is quite broad, class sizes
tend to be especially large, and the typical student is close to
the beginning of his or her college career. However, despite
the course’s breadth of content, it is traditional for instructors
to emphasize experimental research methods, and this material
is usually presented early in the course to enable students to
understand and interpret the empirical studies that form the basis
for the remaining class (Homa et al., 2013).
Our topic of interest was the measurement of central tendency
(including mean, median, and mode), which brings a number
advantages. First, it is broadly relevant to the course and tends
to be covered early across different instructors and textbooks,
which allowed us to coordinate participants from several course
sections. This topic also involves understanding at different levels
of explanation. For example, these measures can be described
in a purely procedural way (e.g., the mean is calculated as the
sum of the values divided by the number of values) or at a
more conceptual level (e.g., the mean is the measurement most
influenced by outliers). Finally, the measurements are inherently
general and broadly applicable across content domains, allowing
us to freely vary the degree of contextualization in the training
materials and measure transfer of these concepts to new content
areas.
In this study, contextualization was independently varied in
two ways: the graphics presented in the training could be rich
and realistic or abstract, and the written description could
include an engaging backstory or could be sparse and detached.
These training materials were presented in either of two content
domains; some students’ training involved summarizing exam
scores on a math test (a relatively familiar content domain for
undergraduates), while others’ involved summarizing the number
of quality control tests passed by table lamps. Students were
assigned to access the trainingmaterials for homework credit, and
the final assessment of learning involved test items on standard in-
class mid-term exams that were separated from the training by at
least 2 weeks.
Participants
The instructors of six different sections of Introductory
Psychology (P101) volunteered to integrate the training materials
about measures of central tendency (and corresponding exam
questions) into their courses during the Fall 2012 term. Total
enrollment across all six sections was 1,447 students. The rights
of student participants were protected under a research protocol
approved by the Indiana University Institutional Review Board.
Participants provided written informed consent during the first
week of the semester, and 205 students were excluded from our
analysis because they did not provide (or were not present to
provide) written informed consent. Another 176 students were
excluded because they did not return pretest responses, did not
take the subsequent exam, or did not access the tutorial. After
these exclusions, 1,066 students remained in our analysis, 639
females and 427 males by self-report. In addition to the ecological
validity provided by this group of participants, they also represent
quite a large sample size for experimental work of this kind.
This allows us to overcome many common inferential problems
associated with small samples when interpreting our data.
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Test Questions
We wrote four multiple-choice test questions evaluating P101
students’ knowledge about measures of central tendency (mean,
median, and mode). Two of these questions pertained to the
mean, median, ormode for exam scores on an elementary school’s
math test, and the other two questions involved quality control
scores for a set of table lamps. Variants of these same four
questions were asked during pretest and posttest, with different
datasets to summarize during pretest and posttest, different
wordings, and different answers and answer orders. Two of the
questions, one for each domain, involved calculating median,
mode, andmean scores. The other two questions were conceptual,
requiring students to understand how the distribution of scores
differentially affects median, mode, and mean. For example, a
conceptual lamp question was: “If most lamps pass about the
same number of tests, but one lamp passes far fewer tests, will
this lamp’s performance affect the mode or the mean more?” (All
materials and datasets are available online through Open Science
Framework at the following link: osf.io/kdf6y/).
Training Materials
Training consisted of a set of instructions about calculatingmeans,
medians, and modes, followed by a series of nine questions (with
response-level feedback), implemented online using Qualtrics.
The questions all involved students’ calculating means, modes,
or medians for a given data set. Accordingly, the training was
more procedurally oriented than the conceptual test questions.
There were three different manipulations of this tutorial: (1:
Domain) the instructions and training questions were either
about summarizing grades on a math test (“grades” domain) or
about summarizing quality control tests for a set of table lamps
(“lamps” domain); (2: Graphics) the instructions either included
real pictures of students and table lamps (“detailed” graphics),
or dots to symbolize these students and lamps along a number
line (“idealized” graphics; similar to Kaminski and Sloutsky,
2013); and (3: Immersion) the instructions either included an
immersive backstory describing the situational importance of
calculating these measures of central tendency (e.g., a fight has
broken out over the correct way to summarize math scores;
“high” immersion) or a simple statement that it is sometimes
useful to have different summary statistics (“low” immersion).
Furthermore, the high immersion materials were written in the
second-person (“Imagine that you are invited into a classroom as
an expert statistician”) while those for the low immersion group
were in a more neutral third-person. These three manipulations
were fully crossed (domain  graphics  immersion; 2  2  2)
for eight different versions of the tutorial (see Figure 1 for sample
materials).
Procedure
We visited the six P101 classes in person during the first week
of the semester, and invited all students to take a short ungraded
multiple-choice pretest and to consent to our analysis of their P101
coursework. Even though the pretest was ungraded, students were
encouraged to pay attention to the questions because very similar
questions would appear on their next test. During the second
week, when students were learning about psychology research
FIGURE 1 | Detailed (top) and idealized (bottom) graphics from the
training in Experiment 1.
methods, instructors assigned them to do the training tutorial
for homework credit, to be completed prior to the subsequent
test date. Every student was randomly assigned to one of the
eight versions of the tutorial, and these tutorials were linked from
class websites (access was restricted so that students could only
see the link for their assigned version of the tutorial). On the
subsequent exam (either the third or fourth week of the semester,
depending on the section), the four post-test questions about
central tendency were embedded among the other P101 multiple-
choice test questions, presented sequentially in the same order as
in the pretest.
Results
A mixed design ANOVA was conducted, including two within-
subjects factors (test item domain: math grades vs. lamps, and
test item type: conceptual vs. calculation) and four between-
subjects factors (training domain: lamps (low familiarity) vs.
math grades (high familiarity), graphics: detailed vs. idealized,
story immersiveness: high vs. low, and P101 section), with
improvement between pretest and posttest as the dependent
variable. (see Table 1, for a summary of results.)
Our primary interest in this study was in the effects of
contextualization on transfer to new domains. To explore such
effects, we examined the interactions between the training and test
domain, and particularly how these were influenced by the varied
contextual factors. A three-way interaction between training
domain, test domain and immersiveness [F(1,1018) = 4.09,
MSE = 0.876, p = 0.04, !2p = 0.004] showed that transfer was
indeed influenced by the contextual detail of the story (see
Figure 2). Specifically, transfer to a new domain (measured by the
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TABLE 1 | Summary of results from Experiment 1.
Intra-domain (trained) Extra-domain (transfer)
Factor Pretest Posttest Improvement Pretest Posttest Improvement
Immersion*
High 1.44 1.77 0.33 (0.75) 1.44 1.76 0.31 (0.71)
Low 1.48 1.78 0.30 (0.75) 1.42 1.82 0.40 (0.76)
Graphics
Detailed 1.45 1.77 0.33 (0.77) 1.44 1.78 0.33 (0.74)
Idealized 1.47 1.78 0.30 (0.73) 1.42 1.80 0.39 (0.73)
Training domain**
Lamps 1.45 1.66 0.21 (0.81) 1.40 1.89 0.49 (0.68)
Grades 1.47 1.89 0.42 (0.67) 1.46 1.68 0.23 (0.77)
Overall 1.46 1.77 0.32 (0.75) 1.43 1.79 0.36 (0.74)
*Indicates p < 0.05; ** indicates p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | Mean posttest improvement in Experiment 1. Transfer was
superior when training involved a less immersive narrative. Error bars
represent standard errors.
test items that were from a different domain from a participant’s
training) was most successful when the training material was less
immersive, rather than when it involved the relatively engaging
back story [M = 0.40 (SD = 0.76) vs. 0.31 (SD = 0.71),
F(1,1065) = 3.96, MSE = 2.15, p = 0.047, !2p = 0.004]. No
such difference was found for non-transfer test items [items that
matched the participant’s training domain;M = 0.30 (SD= 0.75)
vs. 0.33 (SD = 0.75)]. A numerically similar pattern was found
for graphical concreteness, with greater transfer after trainingwith
materials that were less graphically detailed [M= 0.39 (SD= 0.73)
vs. 0.33 (SD = 0.75)], although this difference did not reach
statistical significance, perhaps because the graphics were not as
captivating as the immersive backstory. Overall, then, our data
are consistent with previous research showing that knowledge
transfer is best supported by less contextualized learning. There
was a significant main effect of P101 section [F(5,1018) = 2.88,
MSE= 0.916, p= 0.014, !2p = 0.01], as students in different classes
had different improvements from pretest to posttest. However,
there were no significant interaction effects between P101 section
and any of the experimental factors manipulated in this study.
An additional focus of interest in this study was in the role of
domain familiarity in these effects. A main effect of test domain
[F(1,1018)= 70.48, MSE= 15.12, p< 0.001, !2p = 0.07] reflected
the fact that items involving math grades improved substantially
more than items involving lamp ratings [M = 0.46 (SD = 0.68)
vs. M = 0.22 (SD = 0.79)]. This effect held regardless of training
domain, and was entirely the result of differences in post-test
scores, with pre-test performance being very similar for the two
types [M = 1.43 (SD = 0.62) vs. 1.45 (SD = 0.70; out of a
possible 2)]. Overall, participants in this study had an easier time
applying their learned knowledge to a more familiar domain.
Interestingly, this was true evenwhen students’ initial training was
in the less familiar domain of lamp ratings.
Analysis also revealed a relationship between domain
familiarity and the type of test item (procedural vs. conceptual).
Specifically, an interaction between item type and training
domain [F(1,1018) = 6.82, MSE = 1.648, p = 0.01, !2p = 0.007]
reflected the fact that there was greater improvement on the
conceptual items after training in the less familiar domain [lamp
quality scores; conceptual improvement M = 0.50 (SD = 0.84)]
vs. the more familiar domain of grades [conceptual improvement
M = 0.41 (SD = 0.83); see Figure 3]. One possible interpretation
of this result is as an example of “desirable difficulty” (Bjork,
1994). That is, students who were trained with materials from
an unfamiliar domain were less able to rely on their existing
knowledge structures to scaffold their understanding. While
this would have made initial comprehension more challenging,
this difficulty would have demanded that students process the
material more deeply in order to achieve an appropriate level
of understanding, leading to a stronger conceptual grasp of the
material. The unfamiliar domain would have posed less of a
problem for (and therefore provided less of a benefit for) the
more procedural calculations of central tendencies. Consistent
with this interpretation, we did not observe a similar advantage
for these [M = 0.24 (SD = 0.64) vs. 0.20 (SD = 0.68), for grades
and lamp ratings, respectively].
Discussion
Contextualization in learning can involve important potential
tradeoffs between the ease of understanding material and the
ease of generalizing it. While a growing body of research has
found advantages for decreasingly concrete training materials in
situations where transfer is the ultimate goal, there was reason
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FIGURE 3 | Means showing the interaction between training domain
and test item type in Experiment 1. Training in the less familiar domain led
to greater improvement on conceptual test items. Error bars represent
standard errors.
to question whether this effect would hold in actual educational
environments, where the high potential for distraction might give
a greater priority to the facilitation of comprehension afforded
by concreteness. Our results did not support this possibility,
however. Consistent with previous research, students in our study
were better able to apply their learned knowledge to a new domain
when it had originally been presented during training without
an engaging narrative context. Thus, even in an introductory
undergraduate educational context in which attention and
engagement may be challenging to maintain, the net costs of
contextualization appeared to outweigh any potential benefits.
We also discovered significant effects of the familiarity of the
content domain. Overall, students had an easier time learning
within the familiar domain of grades, and test items on this subject
showed significantly greater improvement than items from the
less familiar domain. On the other hand, we found evidence that
training in a less familiar area could lead to a better conceptual
understanding of relevant principles. When students were trained
in the unfamiliar domain of lamp quality ratings, they showed
greater overall improvement on the conceptually-oriented test
questions.
These results raise interesting issues regarding the relationship
between familiarity and contextualization. In one sense,
familiarity represents a kind of additional context, because it
suggests that individuals will be supplementing any givenmaterial
with a large body of previously known facts and details. This
interpretation is consistent with some of the previously discussed
literature in which greater personal relevance was associated with
decreased transfer (e.g., Son and Goldstone, 2009), and it helps
to explain the enhanced conceptual understanding that we found
following training in an unfamiliar domain. At the same time,
the processing benefits associated with this familiarity seemed
to provide important advantages in those situations that did not
involve the acquisition of new conceptual knowledge. Students’
improvement was greatest on test items from the familiar domain
of grades, and training in that domain was statistically equally
good at supporting transfer of simple procedural content.
Familiarity, like other more concrete kinds of contextualization,
seems to be associated with both important costs and benefits.
EXPERIMENT 2
The first experiment provides evidence that in educational
contexts, as in prior laboratory research, concrete detail may be
detrimental to knowledge transfer. The second experiment serves
to replicate these results in a younger classroom population and
extend them to cases of far transfer.
While the overall research goals of this study are similar to those
of Experiment 1, we modified the operationalization in several
ways. First, the participants in this experiment were seventh and
eighth grade students rather than college undergraduates. Second,
the learning phase of the study involved an in-class activity rather
than a self-guided homework assignment. We also attempted to
extend the manipulation of contextualization outside of the actual
learned example. Whereas the materials in Experiment 1 varied
the concreteness, immersiveness and familiarity of the training
example itself, the example in Experiment 2 is identical for all
participants. The only factor that varies between individuals is
the immersiveness of a separate paragraph preceding the training
task that serves to motivate interest in the topic, although it is not
directly relevant to understanding it. Moreover, these immersive
paragraphs were written without reference to any specific person,
allowing us to explore the effects of immersion without the
potential confounds of personalization.
The study also makes use of a different learning topic.
Positive feedback systems, in which changes to one part of a
system produce effects that lead to additional changes to that
initial part, are widespread in any number of domains, and are
particularly relevant in the sciences. (For simplicity with our
population, we described positive feedback in terms of mutual
influence between two parts of a system, e.g., A increases B,
and B further increases A.) The training materials in this study
involved processes of positive feedback in the reflectance (or
albedo) of the Earth’s polar ice, an important factor in global
climate change. Finally, Experiment 2 made use of a different
dependent measure of conceptual knowledge: students’ ability
to classify new cases according to their underlying structure.
Classification is a fundamental cognitive process, and it serves
as a basis for many other processes. Among other things, it
is particularly relevant within complex problem solving. For
example, individuals with expertise in physics are able to classify
problems according to their meaningful structural commonalities
(e.g., problems based on conservation of energy) rather than their
more immediately obvious surface characteristics (e.g., problems
involving an inclined plane; Chi et al., 1981). Because of this, these
experts will bemuchmore likely than novices to apply appropriate
problem strategies and generate accurate solutions.
Our use of a middle school population also allowed us to
examine possible individual differences in the effects of context.
A significant minority of our students were participating in
an accelerated science program within the school, reflecting
achievement on a test of scientific knowledge. There are many
independent factors that could contribute to membership in this
program, including innate ability, high need for achievement,
and interest in the subject matter. However, these students tend
to possess a relatively deep understanding of the material. Prior
research has shown that expertise in a field is associated with
a greater ability to focus on the relevant structural content of a
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problem while being less influenced by any irrelevant “surface”
features (e.g., Chi et al., 1981; Schoenfeld and Herrmann, 1982).
Because of this, it is possible that students in the accelerated
program will prove less susceptible to the influence of irrelevant
contextual information in our study. This would be consistent
with the results of Goldstone and Sakamoto (2003), who found
that perceptual concreteness exerted themost influence over those
who performed poorly on the initial task.
Given that participants in our task were asked to determine
whether new cases follow a particular underlying structure, we
were also able to assess the possibility of bias effects. That is, it is
possible that posttest responseswould be biased toward classifying
all of the examples as instances of positive feedback—the principle
underlying their training simulation. Our primary questions
will be whether any such bias effects might interact with the
contextualization of the materials.
Participants
This study was conducted with 144 students at a public middle
school, who participated as part of their regular class time
in a General Science course. These included 70 seventh-grade
students and 74 eighth-grade students, drawn from six different
class periods meeting throughout the day. Participants were
roughly evenly divided between males (n = 68) and females
(n = 74), and approximately one-third of these students (n = 49)
were part of the school’s accelerated learning programs (ALPs),
composed of individuals who had passed a rigorous science
achievement test. Eleven students were dropped from the final
analysis because of failure to complete the test materials. The
rights of all student participants were protected under a research
protocol approved by the Indiana University Institutional Review
Board. Written consent was obtained from the parents of all
students at the beginning of the semester, and was separately
obtained from the students themselves at the beginning of the class
session.
Materials and Design
Our measure in this experiment was students’ ability to correctly
identify scenarios as examples of positive feedback systems, tested
both before and after training. Training itself involved a written
description motivating the topic, followed by an interactive
computer simulation demonstrating the phenomenon of positive
feedback in a specific concrete context: global climate change.
Testing and training were identical for all students, with the
exception of a brief motivating paragraph at the beginning of the
written instructions, which varied between participants in terms
of its narrative richness and immersiveness.
The test materials were designed to assess students’
understanding of positive feedback systems across a wide range
of domains. First, students read a definition of positive feedback
(which was slightly simplified in order to be understandable by
their age group; see online materials). Students then read eight
brief scenarios describing a variety of real-world phenomenon,
half of which were examples of positive feedback systems. For
each scenario, students were asked to rate whether the described
situation was an example of positive feedback on a five-point
scale ranging from Definitely not to Definitely yes.
Instructions and Simulation
All students read introductory materials (presented on computer)
describing ice-albedo feedback, a kind of interaction between the
reflectivity of polar ice and the absorption of solar heat. The first
page of these instructions was a brief paragraph motivating the
topic by describing the impact of global warming. For roughly half
of the students (the Low Context group, n = 75), this paragraph
described recent patterns of melting in the Hudson Bay area (see
Figure 4). This topic is relevant to the issue of global climate
change and is straightforward to understand. However, for most
individuals in our study it is not particularly personally relevant
or emotionally engaging, and does not draw on much existing
background knowledge. The remainder of the students (the High
Context group, n= 69) read amotivating paragraph describing the
effects of climate change on polar bear populations. This passage
was designed to be more directly relevant to students’ knowledge
and interests, and it described the plight of these animals in more
personal terms.
This paragraph was followed by a general introduction to
the task and a description of ice-albedo feedback effects. All
students then interacted with a computer simulation of ice-albedo
feedback (developed and implemented in NetLogo; Wilensky,
1999). Students were guided through the task with specific
instructions designed to highlight the feedback behavior of the
system.
The simulation itself displays a top-down view of a polar ice
cap, surrounded by water (see Figure 5). The primary dynamics
of the system involve the size and shape of the ice surface, which is
constantly changing. These changes are driven by several factors,
including general cooling and diffusion of heat. Themost relevant
factors for the students, however, are sunlight and albedo. The
earth is receiving a steady flow of energy in the form of sunlight,
which can be absorbed and can increase an area’s temperature.
However, not all of this energy is absorbed: much of the light
is reflected back into space. Furthermore, the amount of light
that is reflected depends on a given area’s albedo or reflectance.
Critically, ice has a much higher albedo than land or water,
because of its white color. In our simulation, ice only absorbs one
quarter of the energy that is absorbed by the surrounding water.
Because of this, greater ice coverage results in less overall warming.
It is this factor that produces the system’s feedback behavior. A
decrease in ice coverage results in more heat being absorbed,
leading to even more melting, and so on. Conversely, an increase
in ice coverage causes the reflection of more light, reducing the
temperature and potentially causing even more water to freeze.
The simulation uses a grid of colored points to indicate each
region’s overall light reflectance and absorption (the “reflection
grid”). Red dots (darker in Figure 5) indicate absorbed energy,
while blue dots (lighter) indicate reflected energy. This grid
provides a way for students to directly perceive the relative
balance of reflected and absorbed energy in different locations.
Specifically, 80% of the dots on frozen areas show reflectance (blue
dots), compared with 20% of the dots on the water. When active,
this grid flashes on and off in one second increments.
Students were guided through the simulation via specific
instructions, given through popup messages. Initially, students
were familiarized with the operation of the system, first without
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FIGURE 4 | High (left) and low (right) context materials for Experiment 2. These materials were shown prior to the description and instructions for the
training task.
the reflection grid, and then with. Messages appeared at brief
intervals reminding them of the relevant principles of the
system (see online materials for full protocol). Next, students
were instructed to interact with the system in various ways.
For example, students used the simulation’s controls to melt a
significant area of the ice. At this point, the reduced albedo led
to a positive feedback loop in which additional ice melted at
an accelerating rate, until eventually all of the ice had melted.
Next, students used the controls to observe the complementary
feedback effect, with greater ice coverage causing additional
freezing. After each of these tasks, students were explicitly
reminded of the way in which this reflected positive feedback
behavior.
Finally, students were able to freely interact with simulation
for up to 3 min. Additionally, at this point we added sliders that
allowed students to directly control the reflectance of ice andwater
in the simulation.
After the simulation, students were asked to define positive
feedback systems in their own words: “We would like you to tell
us what a positive feedback system is. Just do your best to describe
it in your own words. Please don’t just write about the simulation
you just saw. Instead, try to write about positive feedback systems
in general.”
Results
We coded the pre- and post-training classification tests according
to each response’s proximity to the correct end of the rating scale.
For instance, if a particular scenario described a positive feedback
system, then a response of “Definitely yes” would be assigned a
score of four and a response of “Definitely not” would be assigned
a score of 0, with intermediate responses receiving appropriate
intermediate scores. For scenarios that were not examples of
positive feedback this coding would be reversed, with “Definitely
not” receiving a score of 4 and “Definitely yes” receiving a score of
0. Each participant was assigned an improvement score calculated
as the difference between totaled pretest and posttest scores.
A 2 (condition)  6 (class period) ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of condition on posttest improvement
[F(1,121) = 4.36, MSE = 20.71, p = 0.039, !2p = 0.035], but
no effect of class period [F(5,127)= 1.45, n.s.], and no interaction
between condition and class period [F(5,127) = 1.24, n.s.].
Specifically, planned comparisons showed that those students
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FIGURE 5 | Ice-albedo simulation used in Experiment 2.
in the Low Context condition improved significantly between
pretest and posttest [M = 1.58 (SD = 3.97), F(1,68) = 10.91,
MSE = 7.89, p = 0.002, !2p = 0.138] while those in the High
Context group showed a small numerical decrease in performance
after training [M =  0.36 (SD = 5.21), F(1,63) = 0.31, n.s.]. The
decrease in posttest performance by the High Context condition
meant that no significant improvement was seen when pooling
across all students [M = 0.65 (SD = 4.69), F(1,132) = 2.53,
MSE= 11.00, p= 0.114, !2p = 0.019].
To ensure that this effect was not being driven by a small
subset of the test items, we also performed an item analysis.
A repeated measures t-test, comparing each item’s average
posttest improvement in Low [M = 0.20 (SD = 0.25)] and
High [M =  0.04 (SD = 0.31)] context groups, confirmed a
difference between conditions [F(1,7) = 6.10, MSE = 0.039,
p = 0.043, !2p = 0.465]. For seven of the eight test items,
posttest improvement was greater under conditions of low
contextualization.
One possible explanation for the poorer performance by the
High Context group is that those students were confused or
distracted by the additional engaging information. If so, we should
expect that group to have a poorer understanding of the material
that was learned in training, in addition to their decreased scores
on the classification task. To assess this possibility, we used a five-
point rubric to code the accuracy of students’ posttest attempts to
define positive feedback. In simplified terms, this rubric was as
follows: (1) basic statement of cause and effect; (2) statement that
a change in one variable causes a change in another; (3) inclusion
of direction of change; (4) inclusion of mutual influence (second
variable influences the first); (5) mention of continuing loop and
consequences (e.g., movement toward a maximum or minimum).
We found no difference between the groups on this measure, with
those in the High Context condition actually showing a slight
numerical advantage over the Low Context group [M = 2.11
(SD= 1.53) and 1.99 (SD= 1.46), respectively, out of a possible 5;
F(1,132)= 0.48, n.s.]. The difference in classification performance
FIGURE 6 | Means from Experiment 2 for accelerated and
non-accelerated students. Performance in both groups was equally
affected by richer background context. Error bars represent standard errors.
therefore cannot be attributed to poorer initial learning, but
instead seems to reflect a greater difficulty in applying the
knowledge acquired during interactionwith the simulation to new
situations.
Next, we compared the performance of students in the
accelerated ALPs program with that of their (non-accelerated)
classmates. We had hypothesized that these potentially more
advanced or engaged students might be better able to focus on
the relevant structural content of the training, andwould therefore
show a smaller effect of contextualization. However, this was not
the case. A 2 (ALPs membership)  2 (condition) ANOVA on
improvement scores revealed no main effects for accelerated class
membership [F(1,132) = 0.10, n.s.] and no interaction between
ALPs membership and condition [F(1,132) = 0.02, n.s.; see
Figure 6]. Thus,while those in theALPs groupoutperformed their
peers at both pretest [F(1,131) = 48.84, MSE = 24.65, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.272] and posttest [F(1,131) = 41.36, MSE = 28.32,
p< 0.001,!2p= 0.24], their overall improvement and susceptibility
to context effects did not differ from that of their classmates. Like
the non-accelerated students, performance for the ALPs students
in the High Context condition actually decreased numerically
relative to pretest [M = –0.62 (SD= 3.85)].
Finally, we examined the possibility of bias effects in students’
responses. To measure whether students were biased to make
responses that were consistent with the subject of their training,
we calculated each response’s proximity to the end of the rating
scale marked “Definitely yes,” regardless of whether this was the
correct response. Therefore, each “Definitely yes” response was
scored as a four, each “Definitely not” response was scored as
a 0, and intermediate responses were assigned the appropriate
intermediate value. For each participant, bias was coded as the
difference in this score between pretest and posttest.
Across all students, this average bias score was significantly
greater than 0 [M = 0.30 (SD = 1.01), t(132) = 3.47,
p < 0.001, d = 0.30]. Overall, students were more likely to
classify a scenario as an example of positive feedback after having
received training, regardless of the accuracy of that classification.
However, a 2 (ALPs membership)  2 (condition) ANOVA
on the scores showed that this bias effect did not vary as a
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factor of condition [F(1,132) = 0.32, n.s.] or ALPs membership
[F(1,132)= 1.04, n.s.].
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, students in this study were negatively affected
by exposure to a richer, more engaging background story for the
learning example. High Context students showed absolutely no
posttest improvement as a result of their training. These effects
were found despite the use of a relatively subtle manipulation. All
of the students in this experiment received identical training and
instructions, with the only difference between conditions being
the immersive vs. detached nature of amotivating paragraph prior
to the training simulations that included content only indirectly
related to the simulation itself.
Furthermore, we found the effects of a rich context to be
resistant to learners’ prior knowledge. Prior research has shown
that individuals with greater expertise in a subject area are
better able to disregard irrelevant surface details and focus
instead on the underlying structure of a situation (e.g., Chi
et al., 1981; Novick, 1988). Students in the accelerated science
program could reasonably be expected to have greater expertise
in general scientific principles than their non-accelerated peers,
and consistentwith this their pretest andposttest performancewas
significantly superior to that of their classmates. Despite this, we
found them to be equally vulnerable to our context manipulation.
However, these effects did not appear to be the result of a
poorer understanding of the relevant principles by those receiving
a richer context. When students were asked to define a positive
feedback system in general terms at the end of the experimental
session, those who had read the more engaging motivating
paragraph produced an equally accurate definition as those who
had read the more detached passage.
If poorer understanding is not the cause, thenwhat is the source
of these students’ impaired transfer? We would argue that the
rich context provided by the High Context passage served to tie
students’ understanding of positive feedback systems more tightly
to this one particular content area. Rather than being able to
represent the principles in a more contextually independent and
general way, through concepts such as variability, causation and
mutual influence, their understanding was intimately tied to a
single concrete example involving heat and reflectivity.
On reflection, one interesting way in which the
contextualization may have occurred in this case is that the
inclusion of the polar bear may have drawn participants’ attention
to the specifically negative change in this feedback example (the
decreasing ice habitat). Since all of the correct posttest items
involved positive change, this more specific representation may
have put the High Context group at a particular disadvantage.
Thus, the concrete contextualization in this example may have
influenced participants’ representations of positive feedback
at a fairly deep and abstract level [Schwartz (2015), personal
communication].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
There are solid practical reasons for the traditional advice
that educators should use concrete, meaningful examples in
instruction. Research has consistently shown that this type of
contextualization can enhance understanding, improve retention,
and facilitate effective reasoning about the subject matter.
Furthermore,making connections to students’ existing knowledge
and interests can help to maintain their attention and motivation,
which are critical factors for learning. However, research has also
shown that there are costs associated with this approach: the
more contextualized a training case, the more difficulty learners
can have in recognizing and applying its principles in new and
dissimilar situations.
The undermining of generalization and transfer by contextual
detail could be particularly problematic in general education,
where the ultimate goal is typically to train students for a wide
and unpredictable variety of real-world applications. We had
reason to question whether contextualization would actually be
as detrimental in the classroom as previous laboratory research
has suggested, however. In particular, it would be reasonable to
suggest that attention andmotivation would be especially difficult
to maintain in these environments and populations, and that the
benefits associated with engaging and meaningful material might
exceed any of the conventional costs. Furthermore, whereas the
materials learned in a laboratory experiment may be interpreted
as restricted in relevance to that particular and peculiar context,
materials learned in a classroom context may be construed in
a more expansive manner if taught well (Engle et al., 2012).
However, this did not appear to be the case. In two experiments
utilizing different populations of students enrolled in science
classes, material from different subject areas, different delays for
retention, and different types of tasks and tests, we again found
that greater contextualization impaired students’ ability to apply
their knowledge in new cases.
Interestingly, this was the case even though our studies
represented a kind of cued rather than spontaneous recall. A
large body of previous research has established that concrete
dissimilarities typically impair individuals’ ability to recognize
when prior knowledge is relevant (e.g., Simon and Hayes,
1976; Weisberg et al., 1978; Gick and Holyoak, 1983). In
our studies, however, participants were explicitly aware of the
relevant concept and example. Contextualization was therefore
leading to specific issues with mapping the original case to new
examples.
Our results indicate important differences between materials
that promote good immediate performance and those that
promote transfer. In Experiment 2, definitions of positive
feedback loops as they pertained to the training simulation were
not better for the Low Context narrative compared to High
Context, but transfer was better in the Low Context condition.
In both experiments, transfer was best with relatively simple
and detached narratives. This is somewhat reminiscent of earlier
results showing that understanding of a scientific concept from
a simulation was best when simulation elements were relatively
detailed and concrete, but that transfer of the concept to a
superficially dissimilar simulation was best when the training
elements were idealized (Goldstone and Sakamoto, 2003). One
implication of this pattern of results is that as an instructor designs
their instructional materials, they should be asking themselves
whether they are trying to optimize their students’ demonstrated
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mastery of the material itself or their ability to transfer their
understanding to new materials. While we might intuitively
believe these to be highly correlated, design decisions about
narrative immersion appear to affect these learning outcomes in
opposite ways.
What lessons should educators take from these data? To address
this question, we must first consider the scope of our results.
The present studies represent an attempt to generalize laboratory
results to authentic educational contexts. However, in reality
they reflect only a limited subset of educational experience.
For example, the learning episodes in our experiments involved
expository instruction rather than constructive learning exercises
such as learning by invention (e.g., Schwartz and Martin, 2004).
While there was some degree of interactivity in the computer
simulations used in Experiment 2, this is far removed from the
degree of flexibility and involvement in an interactive group,
where students are free to ask clarifying questions and instructors
and peers may adapt their responses in real time. It therefore
remains to be seen how broadly these effects may generalize to
other instructional settings.
The precise origin of these effects is also unknown. By
definition, contextually-rich learning materials, such as those
that we’ve manipulated in this study, are multifaceted. They
may involve personalization, urgency, social pressures, and a
cornucopia of other factors. Future research may ultimately
attempt to isolate these effects under ideal comparison conditions,
but in the current study, we instead opted to create materials
that were more pertinent to routine educational practice, a sort
of pragmatic trial approach (Roland and Torgerson, 1998). These
immersive qualities (the familiarity of the domain, the presence
of an alluring backstory, the inclusion of pictures and graphics,
etc.) would all commingle in routine classroom settings. While
our current work lacks the explanatory power of a laboratory
study, it nevertheless demonstrates that the combined effects
of contextually-rich training materials are indeed germane to
naturalistic learning scenarios.
Even acknowledging these limitations and taking our results
at face value, the immediate pedagogical implications of our
results are not entirely clear. Should we conclude that meaningful
concrete examples should be eliminated from the classroom?
There are several reasons why we do not believe that this is the
correct conclusion to draw. First, as suggested above, whether
narrative concreteness is positive or negative depends on whether
one is teaching for immediate performance or future transfer.
Second, it is important to remember that all of the materials in
our studies were in fact contextualized. There were no control
conditions in which information was presented in a completely
abstracted or idealized manner. If the concepts involved in
central tendency measurements or feedback systems were given
without any meaningful context at all, it is likely that students
would indeed have had a very difficult time understanding them,
and that both learning and transfer would have suffered as a
consequence. The issues addressed by our data are therefore not
so much about the use of meaningful examples as they are about
the degree of context that will be most effective.
Furthermore, the potential benefits of contextualization are
substantial enough that researchers have invested a great deal
of time into finding ways to overcome their costs (see Day
and Goldstone, 2012). Most of these approaches involve the
presentation of multiple concrete cases. However, simply being
exposed to more than one training example is often not effective
on its own—theway inwhich these cases are chosen and presented
has been shown tomatter a great deal. For example, Goldstone and
Son (2005) found evidence for improved transfer after training
following a pattern of “concreteness fading.” In that research,
participants first learned about a set of principles through a richly
instantiated set of materials. Afterward, this initial concreteness
was “faded” from the instruction as participants interacted with
materials that presented the same relevant principles in a more
idealized way. An evenmore complete concreteness fading regime
that goes first from concrete to idealized, and then from idealized
to formal symbolic, representations has been shown to fairly
consistently improve generalization of training (Fyfe et al., 2014).
Evidently the initial, more contextualized presentation allows
learners to scaffold their understanding by connecting it to their
existing knowledge and schemas, while the subsequent idealized
case helps to dissociate these initial representations from their
original context (also see Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996; Scheiter
et al., 2010). Thus, learners in this condition seem to gain at least
some of the benefits of both concreteness and genericity.
Another method that has been shown to be quite effective in
supporting transfer is the active comparison of multiple training
cases. For example, Loewenstein et al. (2003) taught a group of
management students about the use of “contingency contracts” as
a technique in negotiation. All of these students learned about the
technique by reading two concrete instantiations of the method
in practical application. However, those who simply studied the
two cases in succession showed no benefit from the training, and
they were no more likely to apply the principles appropriately
than a control condition that had received no training at all.
Students who had actively compared the two cases and identified
commonalities between them, however, were nearly three times
as likely to successfully apply their knowledge. Many other
studies have found similar benefits of comparison (e.g., Gick and
Holyoak, 1983; Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989; Cummins, 1992;
Gentner et al., 2009; Christie and Gentner, 2010; Richland and
McDonough, 2010).
The question of contextualization in instruction is therefore
neither simple nor settled, but we are progressing in our
understanding of the issues involved. Simply adding richer
meaningful content to in-class examples may make intuitive
sense, and may have immediately obvious benefits in terms of
student engagement and comprehension. But as the results of our
experiments make clear, these short-term benefits seem to come
at the cost of students’ long-term ability to apply their knowledge.
If educators are to take advantage of these inherent benefits, they
will need to give careful consideration to how such examples are
designed and used together in order to plan the most effective
instruction.
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